Brazil’s ability to overcome political and economic crises has not guaranteed strong institutions, political scientist Marcus Melo argues. In an opinion piece, he says the country has fallen into a “medium-quality democracy” trap: a system that can preserve the democratic regime but cannot stop those in power from appropriating its institutions.
Melo recalls early concerns that Brazil would be ungovernable after its return to democracy. Fragmented parties, constrained presidents and governors’ influence were expected to obstruct reform and economic stabilization. Yet multiparty presidential governments passed difficult reforms, brought hyperinflation under control, and managed the 2002 transfer of power peacefully. The Mensalão trial also showed that members of a party still in government could be held accountable, encouraging hopes of gradual institutional learning.
He finds a parallel in Simon Schwartzman’s analysis of corruption, published in O Estado de S. Paulo on October 9. Schwartzman’s argument, as Melo presents it, is that corruption becomes pathological when it stops being treated as a punishable breach and instead becomes an organizing principle of politics. In a functioning system, wrongdoing may occur, but the press can expose it, investigators can pursue it and courts can impose consequences.
Scandals can therefore tell two stories at once, Melo writes. Their exposure may show that journalists, investigators and parts of the state are still working, while the details reveal how extensively institutions have been captured. The existence of a scandal alone is not proof that the system has stopped responding; the critical question is whether that response continues to function.
Melo says Brazil has crossed a red line, identifying the judiciary as the central concern. Judicial legitimacy depends on independence from other branches of government and private interests, he argues. But protections intended to safeguard the institution can become a shield for its members. In that case, judicial independence risks turning into immunity from accountability and systemic abuse.
He also argues that ideological rivalry cannot explain the decline: corruption is condemned when it involves opponents but treated as a lesser concern when it affects allies. Melo warns that public anger and electoral punishment may not, on their own, undo the mechanisms of institutional capture. Democracy can survive while being deeply degraded, he concludes, leaving Brazil governable in a limited sense but vulnerable to kleptocracy and abuse of power.
Sources: Folha Poder.