Transport Minister Óscar Puente told Spain’s Congress that the rail Control centre received a message saying an Iryo train remained stopped near Urda, in Toledo, but took no action. His account of the crash sequence places the collision at around 8:53 a.m. on Wednesday, when an AVE train struck the stationary Iryo from behind.
According to Puente, at 8:36 a.m. the control centre authorised AVE 2080 to resume its journey after the operator requested that the LZB safety system be disconnected and reconnected. The LZB was still out of service, and the Iryo was stopped ahead, but the AVE was permitted to travel at normal speed rather than at restricted, line-of-sight speed.
At 8:41 a.m., the centre also authorised Iryo 6076 to move. The train did not start, for reasons that remain unknown, and stayed at the entrance signal to Urda. Seven minutes later, its crew reported that it could not resume and was still stopped. Puente said the control centre received the message but did not take action.
By then, the AVE had started moving. Puente said it travelled about 25 kilometres and was estimated to have exceeded 160 kilometres per hour before colliding with the Iryo. At around 8:53 a.m., the Iryo driver reported the collision. At 9:01 a.m., the driver said at least two carriages had overturned, requested that power be cut because the train might be obstructing the adjacent track, and asked for emergency services to be notified.
Puente said seven trains were on the section across both tracks at the time of the accident. They stopped after receiving no authorisation to continue, and several later reported a loss of transmission linked to the failure of the LZB control centre at Urda.
The minister appeared in Congress after the government approved a plan to reinforce high-speed rail safety. On the Madrid–Seville route, the plan will involve reducing train services at least until early 2027.
Puente defended investment in the line, saying a renewal programme worth €780 million had been launched and involved nearly 90 public contracts. Work includes signalling, control and telecommunications upgrades, including the installation of the European Train Control System (ERTMS) Level 2. The system is installed and being tested between Madrid and Córdoba; the section from Córdoba to Seville is still pending, with operation expected in early 2027.
He said the LZB system remains in use on high-speed, regional and metro lines in Germany and Austria, and that its replacement is intended to align the route with the European standard and support interoperability. Puente also said that 75% of failures in safety systems are caused by external factors such as damage, theft or weather. In Spain, the ASFA signalling system is intended to operate if the main system fails, but the transition must follow established procedures because the two systems divide the track differently.
Sources: elDiario.es.